Firm heterogeneity and aggregate welfare by Melitz, Marc J. & Redding, Stephen J.
  
ISSN 2042-2695 
 
 
 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1200 
April 2013 
Firm Heterogeneity and Aggregate Welfare 
Marc J. Melitz and Stephen J. Redding 
 
 
    
Abstract 
We examine how firm heterogeneity influences aggregate welfare through endogenous firm selection. 
We consider a homogeneous firm model that is a special case of a heterogeneous firm model with a 
degenerate productivity distribution. Keeping all structural parameters besides the productivity 
distribution the same, we show that the two models have different aggregate welfare implications, 
with larger welfare gains from reductions in trade costs in the heterogenous firm model. Calibrating 
parameters to key U.S. aggregate and firm statistics, we find these differences in aggregate welfare to 
be quantitatively important (up to a few percentage points of GDP). Under the assumption of a Pareto 
productivity distribution, the two models can be calibrated to the same observed trade share, trade 
elasticity with respect to variable trade costs, and hence welfare gains from trade (as shown by 
Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare, 2012); but this requires assuming different elasticities of 
substitution between varieties and different fixed and variable trade costs across the two models. 
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1 Introduction
Over the last decade, new theories of heterogeneous firms in differentiated product markets have been
developed to account for features of disaggregated trade data. Taking stock, Arkolakis, Costinot and
Rodriguez-Clare (2012) ask whether these new insights for micro data have altered our understanding
of the aggregate welfare gains from trade. They show that there exists a class of heterogeneous
and homogeneous firm models in which a country’s domestic trade share is a sufficient statistic for
the aggregate welfare gains from trade. Thus, if the different models generate the same domestic
trade share, then they also deliver the same welfare gains from that trade. Based on this result,
they summarize the contribution of new theories of heterogeneous firms to our understanding of the
aggregate welfare implications of trade as “So far, not much.”
In this paper, we compare a heterogeneous firm model to a homogeneous firm model that is a
special case with a degenerate productivity distribution. All other structural parameters are assumed
to be the same in the two models. The heterogeneous firm model features an additional adjustment
margin that is absent from the homogeneous firm model, namely the endogenous changes in aggregate
productivity that result from the entry and exit decisions of heterogeneous firms. As a result, the two
models have different aggregate welfare implications. Calibrating to an initial autarky equilibrium
or to an initial open economy equilibrium, we show that welfare is the same in the two models for
the calibrated value of trade costs but is strictly higher in the heterogeneous firm model than in the
homogeneous firm model for all other values of trade costs.
The intuition for our results involves revealed preference arguments of the kind commonly used
in international trade. We start from initial equilibria in the heterogeneous and homogeneous firm
models that feature identical aggregate statistics (including, crucially, welfare). In the homogeneous
firm model, aggregate productivity is exogenous, and hence remains unchanged following changes
in trade costs. In contrast, in the heterogeneous firm model, aggregate productivity responds to
changes in trade costs, associated with the endogenous adjustments in the productivity cutoffs for the
domestic and export market. However, the open economy equilibrium in the heterogeneous firm model
is efficient: a welfare-maximizing social planner faced with the same production and entry technologies
would choose the same allocation as the market equilibrium. Since the social planner chooses a new
allocation following the change in trade costs that has different aggregate productivity from the initial
allocation, this new allocation must yield at least as high (and in general higher) welfare than another
feasible allocation in which aggregate productivity is held constant. But this constant productivity
allocation is identical to the new equilibrium in the homogeneous firm model following the change in
trade costs. Therefore the new equilibrium in the heterogeneous firm model must yield at least as
high (and in general higher) welfare than the new equilibrium in the homogeneous firm model.
The additional adjustment margin of heterogeneous firms entry and exit decisions expands the
production set and enables higher welfare to be achieved in the heterogeneous firm model than in
the homogeneous firm model following the change in trade costs. In the homogeneous firm model,
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either all firms export or no firm exports. In contrast, in the heterogeneous firm model, there is the
possibility of reallocating resources from low productivity firms that only serve the domestic market
to higher productivity firms that export. Therefore the level of welfare that the social planner can
achieve in a model with this extra adjustment margin must be at least as high (and in general higher)
than the level of welfare that can be achieved in a model without it.
After developing these results, we discuss their relationship with Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-
Clare (2012)’s result that a country’s domestic trade share is a sufficient statistic for the welfare gains
from trade in the special case of a Pareto productivity distribution. The two sets of results are consis-
tent with one another because they reflect fundamentally different approaches to comparing models.
Our approach, which we refer to as the “micro” approach, is to compare models that differ in their
productivity distribution but retain the same values for all other structural parameters including trade
costs. In contrast, the approach of Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2012), which we refer
to as the “macro” approach, is to compare models that are calibrated to have the same reduced-form
elasticity of trade with respect to trade costs and the same endogenous domestic trade share.
The macro approach has some advantages: it ensures that both models match key features of
international trade data and compares the two models at empirically-observed moments. However,
calibrating the two models to the same reduced-form trade elasticity involves assuming different struc-
tural demand parameters (different elasticities of substitution between varieties). Furthermore, cal-
ibrating the two models to the same endogenous domestic trade share involves assuming different
trade costs (different values of both fixed and variable trade costs). Therefore, the macro approach
changes the degree of firm heterogeneity, the ability of consumers to substitute between varieties and
the value of trade costs between the two models. In contrast, our micro approach only changes the
degree of firm heterogeneity between models, which enables us to isolate the effect of the degree of
firm heterogeneity on aggregate welfare.
The macro approach’s assumption that there is a single empirical moment summarizing the elas-
ticity of trade with respect to trade costs is also quite restrictive. Even under the assumption of a
Pareto productivity distribution, the heterogeneous firm model has different elasticities of trade with
respect to trade costs depending on whether these trade costs are variable or fixed. More broadly for
general continuous productivity distributions (including Pareto distributions that are truncated from
above), the elasticity of trade with respect to either variable or fixed trade costs is an endogenous
variable. In this general case, we show how this elasticity varies with the magnitude of trade costs
and the relative importance of fixed versus variable trade costs. Our micro approach can be applied
to this more general case where the trade elasticity responds to the change in trade costs.
Finally, the fact that calibrating to the same domestic trade share involves assuming different trade
costs in the two models has important implications for the interpretation of the macro approach. In
some cases, it may be precisely the consequences of a given level of trade costs for trade and welfare
that is of ultimate interest. The micro approach highlights that the answer to this question depends
on the degree of firm heterogeneity.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we begin by contrasting
the closed and open economy equilibria of models with and without firm heterogeneity. Given the
same structural parameters and aggregate productivity, Section 2 shows that the heterogeneous and
homogeneous firm models have the same closed economy welfare. Section 3 shows that the welfare
gains from trade are higher in the heterogeneous firm model than in the homogeneous firm model.
Section 4 provides further economic intuition for our results by showing that the market equilibrium
in the heterogeneous firm model is efficient and developing our revealed preference argument. Section
5 examines the relationship between welfare and a country’s trade share with itself. Section 6 shows
that our results apply for a comparison of two open economy equilibria with different values of trade
costs. Section 7 considers the special case of a Pareto productivity distribution. Section 8 shows
that the differences in the aggregate implications of heterogeneous and homogeneous firm models are
quantitatively relevant. Section 9 concludes.
2 Closed Economy
We compare the canonical heterogeneous and homogeneous firm models of Melitz (2003) and Krugman
(1980).1 The homogeneous firm model is a special case of the heterogeneous firm model with a
degenerate productivity distribution.
2.1 Heterogeneous Firm Model
The specification of preferences, production and entry is the same as Melitz (2003).2 There is a
continuum of firms that are heterogeneous in terms of their productivity ϕ ∈ (0,∞), which is drawn
from a common distribution g (ϕ) after incurring a sunk entry cost of fe units of labor. Labor is
the sole factor of production. Production involves a fixed production cost and a constant marginal
cost that depends on firm productivity, so that l (ϕ) = fd + q (ϕ) /ϕ units of labor are required to
supply q (ϕ) units of output. Consumers have constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences
defined over the differentiated varieties supplied by firms. The equilibrium revenue for a firm with
productivity ϕ is then:
r(ϕ) = RP σ−1p(ϕ)1−σ,
where R is aggregate revenue; P is the aggregate CES price index; and p(ϕ) is the price chosen by a
firm with productivity ϕ. Profit maximization implies that equilibrium prices are a constant mark-up
over marginal cost:
p(ϕ) =
σ
σ − 1
w
ϕ
.
Hence profits are a constant fraction of revenue minus the fixed production cost:
pi(ϕ) =
r(ϕ)
σ
− wfd.
1A web-based technical appendix contains the derivations of all expressions in the paper.
2Following most of the subsequent international trade literature, including Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare
(2012), we consider a static version of Melitz (2003) in which there is zero probability of firm death.
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Fixed production costs imply a productivity cutoff below which firms exit (ϕAd ) defined by the following
zero-profit condition:
rd(ϕ
A
d ) = R
(
σ − 1
σ
PϕAd
)σ−1
w1−σ = σwfd, (1)
where the superscript A denotes autarky.
The equilibrium value of this zero-profit productivity is uniquely determined by the free entry
condition that requires that the probability of successful entry times average profits conditional on
successful entry is equal the sunk entry cost:
[
1−G (ϕAd )] p¯i = wfe. Using the expression for profits
above, this free entry condition can be expressed as:
fdJ
(
ϕAd
)
= fe, (2)
J
(
ϕAd
)
=
∫ ∞
ϕAd
[(
ϕ
ϕAd
)σ−1
− 1
]
dG(ϕ) =
[
1−G(ϕAd )
] [( ϕ˜Ad
ϕAd
)σ−1
− 1
]
, (3)
where J
(
ϕAd
)
is a monotonically decreasing function and ϕ˜Ad is a weighted average of firm productiv-
ities:
ϕ˜Ad =
[∫ ∞
ϕAd
ϕσ−1
dG (ϕ)
1−G (ϕAd )
] 1
σ−1
. (4)
The mass of entrants (Me) equals the mass of producing firms (M) divided by the probability of
successful entry (1−G(ϕAd )):
Me =
M
1−G(ϕAd )
=
R
σw
[
fe +
[
1−G (ϕAd )] fd] , (5)
where the second equation uses the relationship between the mass of firms, aggregate revenue and
average revenue (M = R/r¯ ), the relationship between average revenue and average profits (r¯ =
σ (p¯i + wfd)) and free entry (
[
1−G (ϕAd )] p¯i = wfe).
Combining the mass of entrants (5) and the free entry condition (2), aggregate revenue equals
total labor payments (R = wL), where we choose labor as the numeraire and hence w = 1. Using
this equality of aggregate revenue and total labor payments in the zero-profit condition (1), welfare
can be written solely in terms of the zero-profit productivity (ϕAd ) and parameters:
WAHet =
w
P
=
(
L
σfd
) 1
σ−1 σ − 1
σ
ϕAd . (6)
Therefore the zero-profit productivity (ϕAd ) is a sufficient statistic for welfare.
2.2 Homogeneous Firm Model
We construct a homogeneous firm model that replicates the same aggregate equilibrium as the hetero-
geneous firm equilibrium that we just described. Firms pay a sunk entry cost of fe units of labor and
draw a productivity of either zero or ϕ¯d with exogenous probabilities G¯d and
(
1− G¯d
)
respectively.
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Fixed production costs imply that only firms drawing a productivity of ϕ¯d find it profitable to pro-
duce. Therefore producing firms are homogeneous and there is a degenerate productivity distribution
conditional on production at ϕ¯d.
Note that the only difference between the homogeneous and heterogeneous firm models is the
productivity distribution of entrants: the distribution G(.) is replaced by the degenerate distribution
with parameters G¯d and ϕ¯d. All other parameters are the same. This homogeneous firm model
is isomorphic to Krugman (1980), in which the representative firm’s productivity is set equal to
ϕ¯d and the fixed production cost is scaled to incorporate the expected value of entry costs (Fd =
fd + fe/
[
1− G¯d
]
). These values for the representative firm’s productivity and the fixed production
cost are exogenous and held constant in Krugman (1980). To simplify the exposition, we adopt this
Krugman (1980) interpretation. The representative firm’s production technology is:
l =
q
ϕ¯d
+ Fd. (7)
Consumers again have constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences defined over the differ-
entiated varieties supplied by firms. Profit maximization implies that equilibrium prices are a constant
markup over marginal cost:
p =
σ
σ − 1
w
ϕ¯d
.
Profit maximization and free entry imply that equilibrium output and employment for the represen-
tative variety are proportional to the fixed production cost:
q = ϕ¯dFd(σ − 1), l = σFd.
Using the common employment for each variety, the mass of firms can be determined from the labor
market clearing condition:
M =
L
σFd
. (8)
Using the equilibrium pricing rule and the mass of firms, the CES price index is:
P 1−σ = M
(
σ
σ − 1
w
ϕ¯d
)1−σ
, (9)
where we again choose labor as the numeraire and hence w = 1.
Using the price index (9), the mass of firms (8), and our choice of numeraire, welfare can be written
in terms of productivity and other parameters:
WAHom =
w
P
=
(
L
σFd
) 1
σ−1 σ − 1
σ
ϕ¯d. (10)
2.3 Aggregate Equilibrium Equivalence
We now pick the parameters G¯d and ϕ¯d of the degenerate productivity distribution with homogeneous
firms such that the autarky equilibrium is isomorphic to the heterogeneous firm equilibrium, in the
following sense:
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Proposition 1 Consider a homogeneous firm model that is a special case of the heterogeneous firm
model with an exogenous probability of successful entry
[
1− G¯d
]
=
[
1−G(ϕAd )
]
and an exogenous
degenerate distribution of productivity conditional on successful entry ϕ¯d = ϕ˜
A
d . Given the same value
for all remaining parameters {fd, fe, L, σ}, all aggregate variables (welfare, wage, price index, mass
of firms, and aggregate revenue) are the same in the closed economy equilibria of the two models.
Proof. Combining Fd = fd + fe/
[
1−G(ϕAd )
]
with the free entry condition (2) in the heterogeneous
firm model, we obtain:
Fd
fd
=
(
ϕ˜Ad
ϕAd
)σ−1
. (11)
Substituting this result into closed economy welfare in the homogeneous firm model (10), we obtain
the same welfare in the two models:
WAHom =
w
P
=
(
L
σfd
) 1
σ−1 σ − 1
σ
ϕAd =WAHet.
Equal wages follow from our choice of numeraire (w = 1). Equal welfare and equal wages in turn
imply equal price indices. Equal masses of firms follow from (8), (5) and (11). Equal aggregate revenue
follows from R = wL = L in both models.
3 Open Economy
We consider the canonical case of trade between two symmetric countries, as examined in Krugman
(1980) and Melitz (2003). We assume that the heterogeneous and homogeneous firm models feature
the same trade costs, so that there is a fixed exporting cost of fx units of labor and an iceberg variable
trade cost, where τ > 1 units of a variety must be shipped from one country in order for one unit to
arrive in the other country. We compare the effect of moving from the closed economy to the open
economy on welfare in the two models, keeping all structural parameters other than the productivity
distribution the same in the two models.
3.1 Heterogeneous Firm Model
Equilibrium firm revenues in the domestic and export markets are:
rd(ϕ) = RP
σ−1pd(ϕ)1−σ, rx(ϕ) = τ1−σrd(ϕ),
where the subscript d indicates the domestic market and the subscript x indicates the export market.
Profit maximization implies that equilibrium prices are again a constant mark-up over marginal
costs, with export prices a constant multiple of domestic prices due to the variable costs of trade:
pd(ϕ) =
σ
σ − 1
w
ϕ
, px (ϕ) = τpd (ϕ) , (12)
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This equilibrium pricing rule implies that profits in each market are a constant proportion of revenues
minus the fixed costs:
pid(ϕ) =
rd(ϕ)
σ
− wfd, pix(ϕ) = rx(ϕ)
σ
− wfx.
Here, we assume that fixed exporting costs are incurred in the source country and we apportion
the fixed production cost to the domestic market. The productivity cutoffs for serving the domestic
market (ϕTd ) and export market (ϕ
T
x ) are defined by the following zero-profit conditions:
rd(ϕ
T
d ) = R
(
σ − 1
σ
PϕTd
)σ−1
w1−σ = σwfd. (13)
rx(ϕ
T
x ) = R
(
σ − 1
σ
PϕTx
)σ−1
(τw)1−σ = σwfx, (14)
where the superscript T indicates the open economy equilibrium. Together these two zero-profit
conditions imply that the export cutoff is a constant multiple of the domestic cutoff that depends on
the fixed and variable costs of trade:
ϕTx = τ
(
fx
fd
) 1
σ−1
ϕTd . (15)
For sufficiently high fixed and variable trade costs (τ (fx/fd)
1
σ−1 > 1), only the most productive
firms export, consistent with an extensive empirical literature (see for example the review in Bernard,
Jensen, Redding and Schott 2007).
The free entry condition again equates the expected value of entry to the sunk entry cost,[
1−G (ϕTd )] p¯i = wfe, and can be re-written as follows:
fdJ
(
ϕTd
)
+ fxJ
(
ϕTx
)
= fe, (16)
where J (·) is defined in (3) and we can define weighted average productivity in the export market
(ϕ˜Tx ) in an analogous way to weighted average productivity in the domestic market (ϕ˜
T
d ) in (4).
Using the relationship between the productivity cutoffs (15), and noting that J (·) is a decreasing
function, the free entry condition (16) determines a unique equilibrium value of the domestic cutoff
(ϕTd ), which in turn determines the export cutoff (ϕ
T
x ). Furthermore, since J (·) is a decreasing
function, the domestic cutoff in the open economy is strictly greater than the domestic cutoff in the
closed economy (ϕTd > ϕ
A
d ) for positive values of fixed exporting costs.
As in the closed economy, the mass of entrants (Me) equals the mass of firms (M) divided by the
probability of successful entry (1−G (ϕTd )):
Me =
M
1−G(ϕTd )
=
R
σw
[
fe +
[
1−G (ϕTd )] fd + [1−G (ϕTx )] fx] , (17)
and aggregate revenue equals total labor payments (R = wL).
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Using the equilibrium pricing rule and the mass of firms, the CES price index in the open economy
can be written as:
P 1−σ = M
[(
ϕ˜Td
)σ−1
+ χτ1−σ
(
ϕ˜Tx
)σ−1]( σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
w1−σ, (18)
where χ =
[
1−G (ϕTx )] / [1−G (ϕTd )] is the proportion of exporting firms. We choose labor in one
country as the numeraire. With symmetric countries, this implies a common unit wage in each country
(w = 1).
Rearranging the price index (18), and using the mass of firms (17) and our choice of numeraire,
welfare can be expressed in terms of productivity and parameters:
WTHet =
w
P
=
 L
(
σ−1
σ
)σ−1
σ
[
fe
1−G(ϕTd )
+ fd + χfx
]

1
σ−1 [(
ϕ˜Td
)σ−1
+ χτ1−σ
(
ϕ˜Tx
)σ−1] 1σ−1
. (19)
In an open economy equilibrium with selection into export markets (ϕTx > ϕ
T
d ), the zero-profit condi-
tion for the domestic market (13) implies that open economy welfare can be written equivalently in
terms of the domestic productivity cutoff and parameters:
WTHet =
w
P
=
(
L
σfd
) 1
σ−1 σ − 1
σ
ϕTd . (20)
Comparing (6) and (20), and noting that the domestic cutoff is higher in the open economy than in
the closed economy (ϕTd > ϕ
A
d ), there are necessarily welfare gains from trade.
In contrast, in an open economy equilibrium in which all firms export, the domestic and export
productivity cutoffs are equal to one another (ϕTx = ϕ
T
d ), and are determined by the requirement that
the sum of variable profits in the domestic and export markets is equal to the sum of fixed production
and exporting costs. Using this zero-profit condition, open economy welfare also can be written in
terms of the domestic productivity cutoff and parameters:
WTHet =
w
P
=
((
1 + τ1−σ
)
L
σ (fd + fx)
) 1
σ−1 σ − 1
σ
ϕTd . (21)
Comparing (6) and (21), and noting that fx/fd ≤ τ1−σ in an open economy equilibrium in which all
firms export, there are again necessarily welfare gains from trade.
3.2 Homogeneous Firm Model
In the homogeneous firm model, the probability of successful entry and productivity conditional on
successful entry are exogenous and remain unchanged and equal to
[
1− G¯d
]
and ϕ¯d respectively. For
sufficiently high fixed and variable trade costs (τσ−1fx/Fd > 1), the representative firm does not find it
profitable to export. In this case, welfare in the open economy equilibrium is necessarily higher in the
heterogeneous firm model than in the homogeneous firm model, because the two models have the same
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closed economy welfare, there are welfare gains from trade, and trade only occurs in the heterogeneous
firm model. In contrast, for sufficiently low fixed and variable trade costs (τσ−1fx/Fd < 1), the
representative firm finds it profitable to export. In this case, there is positive trade in both models,
and we now compare their relative welfare in such an open economy equilibrium.
Profit maximization again implies that equilibrium prices are a constant mark-up over marginal
costs, with export prices a constant multiple of domestic prices due to the variable costs of trade:
pd =
σ
σ − 1
w
ϕ¯d
, px = τpd. (22)
Together profit maximization and free entry imply that equilibrium output and employment for the
representative variety are proportional to fixed costs:
q = ϕ¯d (Fd + fx) (σ − 1),
l = σ (Fd + fx) .
Therefore both output and employment rise for the representative firm following the opening of trade
to cover the additional fixed costs of exporting.
From the labor market clearing condition, this rise in employment for the representative firm
implies a fall in the mass of domestically-produced varieties:
M =
L
σ (Fd + fx)
. (23)
Using the equilibrium pricing rule and the mass of firms, the CES price index in the open economy is:
P 1−σ =
[
1 + τ1−σ
]
M
(
σ
σ − 1
w
ϕ¯d
)1−σ
, (24)
where we again choose labor as the numeraire and hence w = 1.
Rearranging the price index (24), and using the mass of firms (23) and our choice of numeraire,
welfare can be again expressed in terms of productivity and parameters:
WTHom =
w
P
=
([
1 + τ1−σ
]
L
σ (Fd + fx)
) 1
σ−1 σ − 1
σ
ϕ¯d. (25)
3.3 Relative Welfare
In the homogeneous firm model, aggregate productivity is exogenous and hence constant by assump-
tion. In contrast, in the heterogeneous firm model, aggregate productivity is determined by the
endogenous entry and exit decisions of heterogeneous firms. This provides a new adjustment margin
through which the economy can respond to the opening of trade. The presence of this new adjustment
margin implies that the relative change in welfare following the opening of trade is strictly larger in the
heterogeneous firm model than in the homogeneous firm model. Since the homogeneous firm model is
a special case of the heterogeneous firm model, this comparison of the welfare gains from trade across
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the two models is equivalent to a comparative static within the heterogeneous firm model on the pro-
ductivity distribution (from a non-degenerate to a degenerate distribution). This comparative static
interpretation requires that we hold all other parameters equal when comparing the two models (same
fd, fe, fx, τ , L, σ). We maintain this assumption throughout the paper whenever we compare the
heterogeneous and homogeneous firm models. We pick the parameters of the degenerate productivity
distribution under homogeneous firms (G¯d and ϕ¯d) such that the autarky equilibrium is isomorphic
to the heterogeneous firm one (as outlined in Proposition 1): G¯d = G(ϕ
A
d ) and ϕ¯d = ϕ˜
A
d
Proposition 2 The proportional welfare gains from trade are strictly larger in the heterogeneous firm
model than in the homogeneous firm model (WTHet/WAHet > WTHom/WAHom), except in the special case
with no fixed exporting cost. In this special case, the proportional welfare gains from trade are the
same in the two models.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the special case with no fixed exporting cost, the domestic productivity cutoff does not respond
to the opening of trade in the heterogeneous firm model. As a result, the additional adjustment margin
provided by heterogeneous firms entry and exit decisions is inoperable, and the welfare gains from
trade are the same in the two models. But this special case is uninteresting, because firm productivity
dispersion plays no role in the heterogeneous firm model (the exit threshold and average productivity
are the same in the closed and open economies). Furthermore, this special case stands at odds with
an extensive body of empirical evidence that only some firms export, exporters are larger and more
productive than non-exporters, and there are substantial fixed exporting costs.3
Since the proportional welfare gains from trade are strictly lower in the homogeneous firm model
than in the heterogeneous firm model for positive fixed exporting costs, and since open economy
welfare in the homogeneous firm model is monotonically decreasing in trade costs, we also obtain the
following result.
Proposition 3 To achieve the same proportional welfare gains from trade requires strictly lower trade
costs (either lower fx and/or lower τ) in the homogeneous firm model than in the heterogeneous firm
model, except in the special case with no fixed exporting cost.
Proof. The proposition follows immediately from WTHet/WAHet > WTHom/WAHom in Proposition 2 and
from
dWTHom
dfx
< 0 and
dWTHom
dτ < 0 in (25).
Although we chose the productivity of the representative firm (ϕ˜Ad ) to ensure the same closed
economy welfare in both models, the ratio of open to closed economy welfare in the homogeneous firm
model WTHom/WAHom is independent of the representative firm’s productivity (from (10) and (25)). It
3For reviews of the extensive empirical literatures on firm export market participation, see Bernard, Jensen, Redding
and Schott (2007) and Melitz and Redding (2012). For evidence of substantial fixed exporting costs, see Roberts and
Tybout (1997) and Das, Roberts and Tybout (2007).
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follows that both of the above propositions hold for any value of the representative firm’s productivity.
Both propositions also hold for general continuous productivity distributions.
4 Revealed Preference
The theoretical results throughout the paper are proved using the free entry condition in the market
equilibrium of the heterogeneous firm model. But to provide further economic intuition for these
results, we consider the problem of a social planner choosing the productivity cutoffs and the mass of
entrants to maximize welfare in the heterogeneous firm model. We begin with the planner’s problem
in the closed economy, in which welfare in the homogeneous and heterogeneous firm models is the
same. We next consider the planner’s problem in the open economy. The planner is assumed to
maximize world welfare. With symmetric countries, this is equivalent to maximizing the welfare
of the representative consumer in each country.4 We show that the planner’s choices in the closed
and open economies coincide with the market allocations, and hence the market allocations in the
heterogeneous firm model are efficient.5 We also show that the social planner in general chooses to
adjust the productivity cutoffs following the opening of trade, even though it is feasible to leave them
unchanged and replicate the open economy equilibrium of the homogeneous firm model. Therefore, by
revealed preference, open economy welfare must be at least as high in the heterogeneous firm model
as in the homogeneous firm model, and we show that it is in general higher.
4.1 Closed Economy
In the closed economy of the heterogeneous firm model, the real consumption index and aggregate
labor constraint for the social planner can be written as:
Q =
{[
1−G(ϕAd )
]
Me
}σ/(σ−1)
q˜Ad ,
L =
[
1−G(ϕAd )
]
Me
[
q˜Ad
ϕ˜Ad
+ fd +
fe
1−G(ϕAd )
]
,
where q˜Ad = q˜
A
d
(
ϕ˜Ad
)
is the output of a firm with a productivity equal to domestic weighted average
productivity ϕ˜Ad ; and we assume that the social planner faces the same productivity distribution G(ϕ)
and entry cost fe per firm as in the market allocation.
Using the aggregate labor constraint in the real consumption index, the social planner chooses
the domestic cutoff ϕAd (and hence the productivity range of producing firms) and the output of a
firm with weighted average productivity q˜Ad (and hence the mass of entrants) to solve the following
4To highlight the efficiency properties of the market equilibrium, we assume a world planner, which abstracts from
the incentives of national planners to manipulate the terms of trade between countries.
5For an analysis of how the efficiency of the monopolistically competitive equilibrium depends on the extent to which
the elasticity of substitution between varieties is constant or variable, see Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) for homogeneous firm
models and Dhingra and Morrow (2012) for heterogeneous firm models.
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unconstrained maximization problem:6
max
ϕAd ,q˜
A
d
{
Lσ/(σ−1)
[
q˜Ad
ϕ˜Ad
+ fd +
fe
1−G(ϕAd )
]−σ/(σ−1)
q˜Ad
}
. (26)
The trade-off faced by the social planner is as follows. On the one hand, a lower productivity cutoff
reduces expected entry costs conditional on successful entry, which releases more labor for production.
On the other hand, the lower productivity cutoff involves production by lower productivity firms, which
reduces expected output conditional on successful entry. From the first-order conditions for q˜Ad and
ϕAd , we obtain: [
1−G(ϕAd )
] [( ϕ˜Ad
ϕAd
)σ−1
− 1
]
fd = fe, (27)
which corresponds to the free entry condition in the market economy (2).
Therefore, the social planner chooses the same productivity cutoff ϕAd (and the same values of
all other endogenous variables) as in the market equilibrium of the heterogeneous firm model. This
confirms that the market equilibrium is efficient. In the heterogeneous firm model, changes in fixed
costs and other parameters induce the social planner to change both the productivity cutoff ϕAd and
the output of a firm with weighted average productivity q˜Ad (and hence the mass of entrants Me). In
contrast, in the homogeneous firm model, productivity is constant by assumption, which implies that
changes in fixed costs and other parameters only induce changes in the mass of producing firms and
output per firm.
4.2 Open Economy
In the open economy of the heterogeneous firm model, the real consumption index and the aggregate
labor constraint for the social planner can be written as:
Q = M
σ/(σ−1)
t q˜
T
t ,
L = Mt
[
q˜Tt
ϕ˜Tt
+
1
1 + χ
(
fd + χfx +
fe
1−G(ϕTd )
)]
,
where Mt is the mass of firms serving each market and q˜
T
t ≡ qd(ϕ˜Tt ) is the domestic output of a firm
with a productivity equal to a weighted average across all non-exporting and exporting firms ϕ˜Tt .
7
The mass of firms serving each market and weighted average productivity are defined as follows:
Mt = [1 + χ]M = [1 + χ]
[
1−G (ϕTd )]Me, (28)
ϕ˜Tt =
{
1
1 + χ
[(
ϕ˜Td
)σ−1
+ χτ1−σ
(
ϕ˜Tx
)σ−1]}1/(σ−1)
. (29)
Using the aggregate labor constraint in the real consumption index, the social planner chooses
the domestic cutoff ϕTd (and hence the productivity range for producing firms), the export cutoff ϕ
T
x
6In the web appendix, we also derive the same results from an equivalent representation of the planner’s problem as
a Lagrangian.
7Recall that χ =
[
1−G (ϕTx )] / [1−G (ϕTd )] is the proportion of exporting firms.
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(and hence the proportion of exporting firms) and the output of a firm with the weighted average
productivity (and hence the mass of firms) as the solution to the following unconstrained maximization
problem:
max
ϕTd ,ϕ
T
x ,q˜
T
t
{
Lσ/(σ−1)
[
q˜Tt
ϕ˜Tt
+
1
1 + χ
(
fd + χfx +
fe
1−G(ϕTd )
)]−σ/(σ−1)
q˜Tt
}
. (30)
The trade-offs faced by the social planner are as follows. A lower domestic cutoff again reduces ex-
pected entry costs conditional on successful entry and thereby releases more labor for production.
But this lower cutoff involves production lower productivity firms, which reduces expected output
conditional on successful entry. A lower export cutoff for a given domestic cutoff increases the pro-
portion of exporting firms. This uses more labor to cover fixed exporting costs and reduces expected
output conditional on exporting, but increases the fraction of foreign varieties available to domestic
consumers. The first-order condition for q˜Tt is:[
1−G(ϕTd )
] [ (1 + χ) q˜Tt
(σ − 1) ϕ˜Tt
− fd − χfx
]
= fe. (31)
It equates the expected profits from entry to the sunk entry cost, since
(1+χ)q˜Tt
(σ−1)ϕ˜Tt
is expected variable
profits conditional on successful entry. The first-order condition for ϕTd yields:(
ϕTd
ϕ˜Tt
)σ−1
1
σ − 1
q˜Tt
ϕ˜Tt
= fd. (32)
It equates the domestic variable profits of the least productive firm with the fixed production cost.
The first-order condition for ϕTx yields:(
ϕTx
ϕ˜Tt
)σ−1
τ1−σ
σ − 1
q˜Tt
ϕ˜Tt
= fx. (33)
It equates the export variable profits of the least productive exporter with the fixed exporting costs.
Combining these three first-order conditions, we obtain the same relationship between the domestic
and export cutoffs (15) and free entry condition (16) as in the open economy market equilibrium. As
a result, the social planner chooses the same productivity cutoffs ϕTd and ϕ
T
x (and the same value of
all other endogenous variables) as in the open economy market equilibrium of the heterogeneous firm
model. Hence the open economy market equilibrium of the heterogeneous firm model is efficient.
4.3 Open Versus Closed Economy
Recall that the heterogeneous and homogeneous firm models generate the same values of all aggregate
variables (including welfare) in the closed economy. Furthermore, it is technologically feasible for
the social planner to choose the same domestic productivity cutoff in the open economy as in the
closed economy (ϕTd = ϕ
A
d ) and to let all firms export (ϕ
T
x = ϕ
T
d ). In this hypothetical allocation,
the heterogeneous and homogeneous firm models would also generate the same values of all aggregate
variables (including welfare) in the open economy.
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However, comparing the closed and open economy free entry conditions (2) and (16), the social
planner in general chooses a different domestic productivity cutoff in the open economy than in the
closed economy (ϕTd 6= ϕAd ) and in general restricts exporting to a proper subset of more productive
firms (ϕTd < ϕ
T
x < ∞). Since the social planner chooses different productivity cutoffs in the open
economy when it is technological feasible to choose the same productivity cutoffs as in the closed
economy, revealed preference implies that these different productivity cutoffs must yield welfare levels
at least as high as a hypothetical allocation with the same productivity cutoffs. Furthermore, the
social planner’s objective (30) is globally concave in {ϕTd , ϕTx , q˜Tt }, which implies that the different
productivity cutoffs must yield strictly higher welfare than the hypothetical allocation with the same
productivity cutoffs. Additionally, the social planner’s choice corresponds to the open economy equi-
librium of the heterogeneous firm model, while the hypothetical allocation corresponds to the open
economy equilibrium of the homogeneous firm model. Therefore it follows that open economy welfare
is strictly higher in the heterogeneous firm model than in the homogeneous firm model whenever the
productivity cutoffs differ in the open and closed economies of the heterogeneous firm model.8
Comparing the social planner’s objectives in the closed and open economies (26) and (30), she faces
different combinations of fixed versus variable costs in the closed versus open economy. The social
planner’s optimal response to these different cost combinations is to adjust the productivity range for
both producing and exporting firms (as well as average output per firm). Thus the greater welfare
gains in the heterogeneous firm model reflect the presence of an additional adjustment margin (the
firm productivity ranges) relative to the homogeneous firm model. In the heterogeneous firm model,
the social planner can allocate low-productivity firms to serve only the domestic market and reallocate
resources to higher-productivity exporting firms. Therefore the welfare that the social planner can
achieve in a model with this additional adjustment margin must be at least as high (and in general
higher) than in a model without it.
While we have focused on opening the closed economy to trade, an analogous analysis can be
undertaken for the reverse comparative static of closing the open economy. Choosing the degenerate
productivity distribution in the homogeneous firm model such that the two models to have the same
welfare in an initial open economy equilibrium, the welfare costs of closing the open economy are
smaller in the heterogeneous firm model than in the homogeneous firm. Again the welfare that the
social planner can achieve in the heterogeneous firm model with its additional adjustment margin must
be at least as high (and in general higher) than in the homogeneous model. As a result, whether we
consider increases or reductions in trade costs, welfare in the two models is the same for the calibrated
value of trade costs, but is strictly higher in the heterogeneous firm model than in the homogeneous
firm model for all other values of trade costs.
8While to make our argument as clearly as possible we focus on symmetric countries, this revealed preference argument
applies more generally for asymmetric countries.
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5 Trade Shares and Welfare
We now examine the relationship between the heterogeneous and homogeneous firm models’ predic-
tions for welfare and their predictions for domestic trade shares. In an open economy equilibrium of
the heterogeneous firm model, the domestic trade share is:
λHet =
pd
(
ϕ˜Td
)1−σ
pd
(
ϕ˜Td
)1−σ
+ χτ1−σpd (ϕ˜Tx )
1−σ =
1
1 + τ1−σΛ
, (34)
where Λ =
∫∞
ϕTx
ϕσ−1dG (ϕ)∫∞
ϕTd
ϕσ−1dG (ϕ)
.
In contrast, in an open economy equilibrium of the homogeneous firm model in which the representative
firm exports, the domestic trade share is:
λHom =
pd
(
ϕ˜Ad
)1−σ
(1 + τ1−σ) pd
(
ϕ˜Ad
)1−σ = 11 + τ1−σ . (35)
Comparing the domestic trade shares in the heterogeneous and homogeneous firm models ((34) and
(35) respectively) for the same trade costs {fx, τ}, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 4 Whenever the representative firm exports in the homogeneous firm model and there is
selection into export markets in the heterogeneous firm model (0 < τ (fx/Fd)
1/(σ−1) < 1 < τ (fx/fd)1/(σ−1)),
the domestic trade share λ is strictly higher in the heterogeneous firm model than in the homogeneous
firm model. If all firms export in both models (0 ≤ τ (fx/Fd)1/(σ−1) < τ (fx/fd)1/(σ−1) ≤ 1), the
domestic trade shares are the same.
Proof. For 0 < τ (fx/Fd)
1/(σ−1) < 1 < τ (fx/fd)1/(σ−1), we have ϕTx > ϕTd , which implies 0 < Λ < 1
and hence λHet > λHom in the domestic trade shares (34) and (35). For 0 ≤ τ (fx/Fd)1/(σ−1) <
τ (fx/fd)
1/(σ−1) ≤ 1, we have ϕTx = ϕTd , Λ = 1 and λHet = λHom.
Proposition 4 implies a non-monotonic relationship between relative domestic trade shares in the
two models and trade costs. We illustrate this non-monotonic relationship for the special case of a
Pareto distribution in our simulations of the model in Section 8 below (see in particular Panel D of
Figures 1 and 2). For sufficiently high trade costs, there is trade in the heterogeneous firm model,
but the representative firm does not find it profitable to export in the homogeneous firm model. As
a result, the domestic trade share is lower in the heterogeneous firm model than in the homogeneous
firm model. As trade costs fall, the representative firm starts to export in homogeneous firm model,
at which point the domestic trade share in the homogeneous firm model falls discretely from one to
a value below that in the heterogeneous firm model. For all values of trade costs with selection into
export markets in the heterogeneous firm model and positive trade in the homogeneous firm model,
the domestic trade share is higher in the heterogeneous firm model than in the homogeneous firm
model. As trade costs fall further, ϕTd → ϕTx and the domestic trade share in the heterogeneous firm
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model converges towards the domestic trade share in the homogeneous firm model. Once trade costs
reach the point at which all firms export in the heterogeneous firm model, the domestic trade share
is the same in the two models.
Proposition 4 highlights the complex relationship between domestic trade shares and welfare in the
heterogeneous and homogeneous firm models. The domestic trade share is an endogenous variable and
in general differs between the heterogeneous and homogeneous firm models given the same structural
parameters and trade costs. Furthermore, the domestic trade share can be strictly higher in the
heterogeneous firm model than in the homogeneous firm model even though welfare is strictly higher
in the heterogeneous firm model (Propositions 2 and 4).
Heterogeneous firms’ endogenous entry and exit decisions also have implications for the elasticity of
trade flows with respect to trade costs. In the homogeneous firm model, the elasticity of the domestic
trade share with respect to variable trade costs depends solely on the elasticity of substitution between
varieties and the domestic trade share:
dλHom
dτ
τ
λHom
= (σ − 1) (1− λ) ,
and the elasticity of the domestic trade share with respect to fixed exporting costs is equal to zero:
dλHom
dτ
fx
λHom
= 0.
In contrast, in the heterogeneous firm model, the elasticities of the domestic trade share with respect
to variable trade costs and fixed exporting costs are endogenous variables that depend on the entire
productivity distribution:
dλHet
dτ
τ
λ
=
[
(σ − 1)− dΛ
dτ
τ
λHet
]
(1− λ) ,
dλHet
dτ
fx
λHet
= −dΛ
dτ
fx
λHet
(1− λ) ,
dΛ
dτ
τ
λHet
= −
[ (
ϕTx
)σ−1
g (ϕx)∫∞
ϕTx
ϕσ−1dG (ϕ)
−
(
ϕTd
)σ−1
g (ϕd)∫∞
ϕTd
ϕσ−1dG (ϕ)
]
τ,
dΛ
dτ
fx
λHet
= −
[ (
ϕTx
)σ−1
g (ϕx)∫∞
ϕTx
ϕσ−1dG (ϕ)
−
(
ϕTd
)σ−1
g (ϕd)∫∞
ϕTd
ϕσ−1dG (ϕ)
]
fx,
where ϕTx > ϕ
T
d and
∫∞
ϕTx
ϕσ−1dG (ϕ) <
∫∞
ϕTd
ϕσ−1dG (ϕ).
Therefore the elasticity of the domestic trade share with respect to trade costs varies with the
functional form of the productivity distribution, the level of trade costs, and the relative importance
of fixed versus variable trade costs. It follows that there is no single elasticity of trade flows with respect
to trade costs in the heterogeneous firm model with a general continuous productivity distribution.
Rather empirical measures of this elasticity capture an endogenous variable that depends on the full
structure of the model.
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6 Trade Liberalization in the Open Economy
We now examine the aggregate welfare implications of the two models starting from an open economy
equilibrium. In Proposition 4, we showed that whenever the heterogeneous firm model features export
market selection, the homogeneous firm counterpart model cannot be calibrated to generate the same
initial domestic trade share given the same trade costs {fx, τ}.9
Thus, we cannot construct an open economy homogeneous firm model that features (a) the same
structural parameters as our heterogeneous firm model with export market selection and (b) the same
initial domestic trade share and welfare. We therefore consider an extension of the homogeneous firm
model to allow for two types of firms: exporting and non-exporting firms. In this extension, firms
again pay a sunk entry cost of fe units of labor before observing their productivity. An entering firms
draws a productivity level ϕ¯x with probability
[
1− G¯x
]
, and draws a productivity level ϕ¯dx with
probability G¯dx. The remaining firms draw a productivity level of zero (which occurs with probability[
G¯x − G¯dx
]
).
We pick the parameters of the “extended” homogeneous firm model (ϕ¯x, ϕ¯dx, G¯x, G¯dx) such that
the open economy equilibrium features the same aggregate variables as in the initial open economy
equilibrium with heterogenous firms (same welfare, wage, price index, mass of firms, aggregate revenue,
and domestic trade share). This requires equating these parameters with their corresponding averages
under firm heterogeneity:
G¯x = G
(
ϕTx
)
, G¯dx = G
(
ϕTx
)−G (ϕTd ) ,
ϕ¯x = ϕ˜
T
x , ϕ¯dx =
{
1
G (ϕTx )−G
(
ϕTd
) ∫ ϕTx
ϕTd
ϕσ−1dG (ϕ)
} 1
σ−1
,
since this last term represents the average productivity of non-exporters in the heterogeneous firm
model. As with all our previous comparative statics, we keep the values of all the other structural
parameters (fd, fe, fx, τ , L, σ) constant across the two models. These assumptions ensure that, in our
extended-homogeneous-firm setup, the firms with productivity ϕ¯x will find it profitable to produce
for both the domestic and export markets, while the firms with productivity ϕ¯dx will only find it
profitable to produce for the domestic market (leading to the property that the aggregate statistics
line-up across the two models in the initial open economy equilibrium).
These two models will nevertheless feature a key difference in response to a reduction in trade
cots from this common initial equilibrium: In the heterogeneous firm model, the endogenous selection
responses to trade costs lead to changes in the average productivity of exporting and non-exporting
firms (also inducing a response in the proportion of exporting firms). In contrast, those average
productivity levels for exporters and non-exporters remain fixed in our extended-homogeneous-firm
9The calibration of the heterogeneous and homogeneous firm models to achieve the same domestic trade share and
welfare under a Pareto productivity distribution (as in Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez Clare 2012) involves assuming
different fixed and variable trade costs in the two models, as discussed further in the next section.
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model.10 Once again, this endogenous response of firm selection and average productivity leads to
larger welfare gains from a given reduction in trade costs under firm heterogeneity:
Proposition 5 Starting from an initial open economy equilibrium with the same welfare and domestic
trade share, a common reduction in variable and/or fixed trade costs generates greater welfare gains
in the heterogeneous firm model than in our extended-homogeneous model. Achieving the same welfare
gains in both models requires a larger reduction in trade costs in the extended homogeneous firm model
than in the heterogeneous firm model.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that the extended homogeneous firm model is equivalent to a version of the heterogeneous
firm model in which the domestic and export productivity cutoffs are held constant at their values
in the initial equilibrium. Therefore the comparison of the heterogeneous and extended homogeneous
firm models in Proposition 5 is equivalent to the following thought experiment. Start from an initial
open economy equilibrium of the heterogeneous firm model with symmetric countries and selection
into export markets. Now reduce trade costs and consider two cases. In the first case, let the domestic
and export cutoffs adjust endogenously. In the second case, hold the thresholds constant at their
initial values before the reduction in trade costs. As shown in the proof of the proposition, welfare is
higher in the first case in which the domestic and export cutoffs adjust endogenously.
Atkeson and Burstein (2010) consider this thought experiment and show that endogenous changes
in the domestic and export cutoffs have only second-order effects on welfare. Proposition 5 is consistent
with this result. As shown in the previous section, the initial equilibrium of the heterogeneous firm
model is efficient. Therefore the envelope theorem implies that the changes in the productivity cutoffs
in the heterogeneous firm model have only second-order effects on welfare (30). But for substantial
reductions in trade costs, these changes in the productivity cutoffs can have substantial effects on
welfare, because the second-order terms can be large. In Section 8, we examine the quantitative
magnitude of these effects using a calibration of the heterogeneous firm model to key U.S. aggregate
and firm statistics.
While Proposition 5 focuses on reductions in trade costs, an analogous analysis can be under-
taken for the reverse comparative static of increases in trade costs, and the same arguments apply
as already discussed above. Proposition 5 makes clear that the new aggregate welfare implications of
the heterogeneous firm model do not arise from firm heterogeneity per se, since exogenous differences
between exporters and non-exporters exist in the extended homogeneous firm model. Instead, they
stem from endogenous firm heterogeneity: the endogenous selection of firms into the domestic and
export markets. This introduces a new adjustment margin through which the economy can respond
to trade liberalization; a margin that is absent in both the homogeneous and extended-homogeneous
firm models.
10Unless the reduction in trade costs is so large that the non-exporting firms in the initial equilibrium find it profitable
to start exporting in the new equilibrium. In this case, the productivity levels for the two types of firms remain constant,
but the proportion of exporting firms changes.
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7 Pareto Productivity Distribution
While our results in the previous sections are developed for general continuous productivity distribu-
tions, we now consider the special case of a Pareto productivity distribution. Under this functional
form assumption, our heterogeneous firm model falls within the class considered by Arkolakis, Costinot
and Rodriguez-Clare (2012), where a country’s domestic trade share is a sufficient statistic for the
welfare gains of trade. Assuming that productivity has the following Pareto distribution:
g (ϕ) = k (ϕmin)
k ϕ−(k+1), k > σ − 1, ϕmin > 0,
we can solve in closed form for the domestic and export productivity cutoffs. Using these solutions,
welfare in the heterogeneous firm model (20) can be expressed solely in terms of a country’s domestic
trade share and parameters:
WHet =
w
P
= λ
−1/k
Het L
1/(.σ−1)
 ϕkminf1− kσ−1d
fe
(
σ
σ−1
)k
σ
k
σ−1
σ − 1
k − (σ − 1)

1
k
. (36)
Therefore, under this assumption of a Pareto productivity distribution, knowing a country’s domestic
trade share (λ) and the shape parameter of the productivity distribution (k) is sufficient to determine
the welfare gains from trade in the heterogeneous firm model:
WTHet
WAHet
=
[
1
λTHet
] 1
k
. (37)
With a Pareto productivity distribution, the elasticity of the domestic trade share with respect to
variable trade costs is:
dλHet
dτ
τ
λHet
=
{
k (1− λHet) τ (fx/fd)1/(σ−1) ≥ 1
(σ − 1) (1− λHet) τ (fx/fd)1/(σ−1) < 1
, (38)
In contrast, in the homogeneous firm model, the domestic trade share (35) and welfare in the
closed and open economies ((10) and (25) respectively) imply that the welfare gains from trade can
be expressed as:
WTHom
WAHom
=
[
Fd
λTHom (Fd + fx)
] 1
σ−1
. (39)
In this homogeneous firm model, knowing a country’s domestic trade share (λ) and the elasticity of
substitution (σ) is sufficient to determine the welfare gains from trade only in the absence of fixed
export costs. Otherwise, the ratio of those fixed export costs to the remaining fixed costs is also
needed to compute those welfare gains. In the homogeneous firm model, the elasticity of the domestic
trade share with respect to variable trade costs remains as specified in Section 5.
As in Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2012), the heterogeneous and homogeneous firm
models can be calibrated to have the same domestic trade share (λT ), the same elasticity of trade flows
with respect to variable trade costs (kHet = σHom−1), and the same welfare gains from trade (if there
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are no fixed exporting costs in the homogeneous firm model). Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-
Clare (2012) conclude that this result implies “not much” insight from heterogeneous firm models for
the aggregate implications of trade. However, Propositions 1-5 were derived for general continuous
productivity distributions and hence hold in the special case of a Pareto productivity distribution.
Therefore, considering a homogeneous firm model that is a special case of the heterogeneous firm
model with degenerate productivity distribution and that has the same values of all other parameters
including fixed and variable trade costs, the two models have different aggregate welfare implications.
These two divergent results reflect fundamentally different approaches to comparing models, which
we referred to in the introduction as the macro and micro approaches. In the macro approach of
Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2012), the homogeneous and heterogeneous firm models are
calibrated to match the endogenous domestic trade share and a reduced-form trade elasticity. This
approach requires different assumptions regarding the structural demand and trade cost parameters
in the two models: the elasticity of substitution between goods must differ (σHet < σHom since
σHet−1 < kHet = σHom−1); variable trade costs must differ (τHet 6= τHom from Proposition 4); and the
homogeneous firm model must assume no fixed exporting cost whereas the heterogeneous firm model
requires positive fixed exporting costs to generate selection into export markets (fx,Hom = 0 < fx,Het).
Therefore, the macro approach simultaneously changes the degree of firm heterogeneity, the ability
of consumers to substitute between varieties and the value of trade costs between the two models.
In contrast, our micro approach only changes the degree of firm heterogeneity between models. This
enables us to isolate the effect of the degree of firm heterogeneity on aggregate welfare.
Since the homogeneous firm model is a special case of the heterogeneous firm model, our comparison
of the two models is equivalent to a discrete comparative static of moving from a non-degenerate to
a degenerate productivity distribution within the heterogeneous firm model. If productivity in the
heterogeneous firm model is assumed to be Pareto distributed, the degree of firm heterogeneity is
summarized by a single parameter: the shape parameter k, with lower values of k corresponding to
greater firm heterogeneity. Therefore, in this special case, we can complement the above discrete
comparative static with a continuous comparative static in the degree of firm heterogeneity.
Proposition 6 Assuming a Pareto productivity distribution with shape parameter k > σ − 1 and
positive fixed exporting costs, the greater the dispersion of firm productivity (smaller k), (a) the larger
the proportional welfare gains from opening the closed economy to trade in the heterogeneous firm
model (larger WTHet/WAHet), (b) the larger (smaller) the proportional welfare gains (costs) from a
reduction (increase) in variable trade costs.
Proof. See the appendix.
In Proposition 6, we change the degree of firm heterogeneity (k) holding all other parameters of
the model constant. Therefore, in part (a), we compare closed and open economy equilibria in two
heterogeneous firm models that have the same values of all parameters except for the degree of firm
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heterogeneity. Similarly, in part (b), we compare two open economy equilibria with different values
of trade costs in two heterogeneous firm models that have the same values of all parameters except
for the degree of firm heterogeneity. In both cases, we determine the proportional changes in welfare
between the two equilibria as a function of the parameters of the model. Again the same arguments
apply irrespective of whether we consider reductions or increases in trade costs.
As mentioned in the introduction, the macro approach’s assumption that there is a single empirical
moment summarizing the elasticity of trade with respect to trade costs is also quite restrictive. Even
under the assumption of a Pareto productivity distribution, the elasticity of trade with respect to
trade costs is a reduced-form parameter in the heterogeneous firm model that depends on several
structural parameters. For variable trade costs, this elasticity is k > σ − 1 for parameter values for
which there is selection into export markets (τσ−1fx/fd > 1) and σ−1 for parameter values for which
all firms export (τσ−1fx/fd ≤ 1). Assuming k = σHom − 1 > σHet − 1 ensures the same elasticity of
trade with respect to variable trade costs in the two models for parameter values for which there is
selection into export markets in the heterogeneous firm model (τσ−1fx/fd > 1), but implies a different
trade elasticity in the two models (σHom−1 6= σHet−1) for parameter values for which all firms export
in the heterogeneous firm model (τσ−1fx/fd ≤ 1).
Additionally, even with a Pareto productivity distribution, the heterogeneous firm model features
different elasticities of trade with respect to trade costs depending on whether these trade costs are
fixed or variable. The trade elasticity for variable trade costs is k when only some firms export (or σ−1
when all firms export), whereas the trade elasticity for fixed exporting costs is (k − (σ − 1)) / (σ − 1).
Therefore empirically-measured elasticities of trade flows with respect to observed trade barriers (e.g.
tariffs, transport costs, distance) can differ depending on whether these empirical barriers affect fixed
versus variable trade costs.
More broadly for general continuous productivity distributions, we showed that the elasticity of
trade with respect to either variable or fixed trade costs is an endogenous variable. In this general case,
the trade elasticity varies with the magnitude of trade costs, the relative importance of fixed versus
variable trade costs, and the functional form of the productivity distribution. Our micro approach
can be applied to this more general case where the trade elasticity responds to the change in trade
costs.
Even small departures from the Pareto distribution can generate substantial variation in this key
endogenous trade elasticity. One empirically relevant example is the introduction of an upper bound
on firm productivity draws, while maintaining their Pareto shape. Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein
(2008) show that allowing for such a bound in the gravity estimation of aggregate bilateral trade
flows leads to substantial variation in the elasticity of trade with respect to distance. This estimation
nests the case considered by Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2012) of an unbounded Pareto
distribution or the case of upper bounds on the productivity distribution that are sufficiently high
that there is little predicted variation in that trade elasticity. In the resulting estimates, the trade
elasticity varies to the order of 30-60 percent for developed and developing countries.
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Finally, we return to the point that calibrating the heterogeneous and homogeneous firm models
to the same domestic trade share requires an assumption that the level of trade costs (both fixed and
variable) is different across the two models. This requirement holds even under the special case of an
unbounded Pareto distribution of productivity and, as mentioned in the introduction, has important
implications for the interpretation of the macro approach when evaluating the question of the trade
and welfare effects of a given level of trade costs. For some policy issues, it may be precisely the
answer to this question that is of ultimate interest, and the micro approach highlights that the answer
depends on the degree of firm heterogeneity.
8 Quantitative Relevance
In this section, we use the assumption of a Pareto productivity distribution to show that the differences
in the aggregate implications of heterogeneous and homogeneous firms are of quantitative relevance.
We choose standard values for the model’s parameters based on central estimates from the existing
empirical literature and moments of the U.S. data.
We set the elasticity of substitution between varieties σ = 4, which is consistent with the estimates
using plant-level U.S. manufacturing data in Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003). Since pro-
ductivity is Pareto distributed and firm revenue is a power function of firm productivity, firm revenue
also has a Pareto distribution: G (r) = 1−( rdr ) kσ−1 , where rd is the revenue of the least productive firm.
Existing empirical estimates suggest that the firm size distribution is well approximated by a Pareto
distribution with a shape parameter close to one (see for example Axtell 2001). Therefore, we set the
Pareto shape parameter for firm productivity k = 4.25, which ensures a Pareto shape parameter for
firm revenue close to one and that log firm revenue has a finite mean ( kσ−1 = 1.42 > 1). A choice for
the Pareto scale parameter is equivalent to a choice of units in which to measure productivity, and
hence we normalize ϕmin = 1.
We consider trade between two symmetric countries, and choose labor in one country as the
numeraire (w = 1), which implies that the wage in both countries is equal to one. With a Pareto
productivity distribution, scaling L and {fe, fd, fx} up or down by the same proportion leaves the
productivity cutoffs {ϕTd , ϕTx } and the mass of entrants unchanged (Me), and merely scales average
firm size (r¯) up or down by the same proportion. Therefore we set L equal to the U.S. labor force
and normalize fd to one. We choose values for {τ , fe, fx} to match moments of the U.S. data. We
calibrate τ to match the average fraction of exports in firm sales in U.S. manufacturing ( τ
1−σ
1+τ1−σ = 0.14,
as reported in Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott 2007), which implies τ = 1.83 (which is in line
with the estimate of 1.7 in Anderson and van Wincoop 2004). Given our choice for the parameters
{σ, k, ϕmin, fd, τ}, we choose {fe, fx} to ensure that the model is consistent with the annual exit rate
for U.S. firms with more than 500 employees (0.0055, as reported in Atkeson and Burstein 2010) and
the average fraction of U.S. manufacturing firms that export (0.18, as reported in Bernard, Jensen,
Redding and Schott 2007). We match both these moments with fe = 0.0145 and fx = 0.545.
Given these parameter values, we solve for the closed economy equilibrium of the heterogeneous
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Figure 1: Reductions in variable trade costs
firm model, including the probability of successful firm entry
[
1−G (ϕAd )] and weighted average
productivity (ϕ˜Ad ). In the homogeneous firm model, we set the probability of successful firm entry
and productivity conditional on successful entry equal to these values:
[
1− G¯d
]
=
[
1−G (ϕAd )] and
ϕ¯d = ϕ˜
A
d . All parameters besides the productivity distribution {fd, fe, fx, τ , L, σ} are assumed to be
the same in the two models, which implies Fd = fd + fe/
[
1−G (ϕAd )]. Given these same parameters,
welfare and all other aggregate variables are identical in the closed economy equilibria of the two
models.
In Figures 1 and 2, we show the impact of reducing trade costs from their infinite values under
autarky to a range of finite values in the open economy equilibrium. Figure 1 sets fixed exporting costs
equal to their calibrated value of (fx = 0.545) and considers reductions in variable trade costs from
infinity to τ ∈ [1, 2.5] (including the calibrated value of 1.83). Panel A displays the welfare gains from
opening the closed economy to trade (WT /WA); Panel B displays the probability of exporting (χ);
Panel C displays domestic weighted average productivity relative to its value under autarky (ϕ˜Td /ϕ˜
A
d );
Panel D displays the domestic trade share (λ). The solid blue line shows values in the heterogeneous
firm model, while the red dashed line shows values in the homogeneous firm model.
As shown in Panel A, the welfare gains from trade in the heterogeneous firm model are strictly
greater than those in the homogeneous firm model for all finite values of variable trade costs. Across
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the range of variable trade costs shown in the figure, the welfare gains from trade range from 1.00 to
1.21, which is broadly in line with existing empirical estimates from quantitative trade models.
For sufficiently high variable trade costs, the representative firm does not find it profitable to
export in the homogeneous firm model. At this value for variable trade costs, the probability of
exporting in the homogeneous firm model falls from one to zero (Panel B); the domestic trade share in
the homogeneous firm model rises to one (Panel D); and welfare in the homogeneous firm model equals
its autarkic value, even though there remain substantial welfare gains from trade in the heterogeneous
firm model (Panel A).
However, even for variable trade costs for which there is trade in both models, the heterogeneous
firm model generates substantially greater welfare gains from trade. For example, for τ = 1.60, the
difference in welfare gains from trade between the two models (two percentage points) is as large as
the overall welfare gains from trade in the homogeneous firm model (two percentage points). These
differences in the welfare gains from trade between the two models are driven by the endogenous
responses of the domestic and export productivity cutoffs to changes in trade costs in the heterogeneous
firm model. In Panel C, productivity is constant by assumption in the homogeneous firm model. In
contrast, weighted average productivity in the domestic market in the heterogeneous firm model rises
by around 10 percent relative to its autarkic value as variable trade costs fall to one.
For sufficiently low values of variable trade costs, all firms export in the heterogeneous firm model.
For this range of parameter values, the probability of exporting is one in both models (Panel B);
the domestic trade share is the same in the two models (Panel D); and once all firms export further
reductions in variable trade costs leave weighted average productivity unchanged (Panel C). Even for
this range of trade costs (including τ = 1), welfare in the heterogeneous firm model is strictly higher
than in the homogeneous firm model, because of positive fixed exporting costs, which imply that the
domestic productivity cutoff is different in the open and closed economy of the heterogeneous firm
model.
Figure 2 sets variable trade costs equal to their calibrated value of τ = 1.83 and considers reductions
in fixed exporting costs from infinity to fx ∈ [0, 1] (which includes our calibrated value of 0.545). Each
panel of the figure is constructed in the same way as for Figure 1. Again the solid blue line shows
values in the heterogeneous firm model, while the dashed red line shows values in the homogeneous
firm model.
As shown in Panel A, the welfare gains from trade in the heterogeneous firm model are again
strictly greater than those in the heterogeneous firm model, except in the limiting case in which fixed
exporting costs are equal to zero. In general, the welfare gains from trade for these reductions in fixed
exporting costs are smaller in Figure 2 than for the reductions in variable trade costs in Figure 1,
which reflects the relatively high calibrated value of variable trade costs.
For sufficiently high fixed exporting costs, the representative firm ceases to export in the homoge-
neous firm. At this value for fixed exporting costs, the probability of exporting in the homogeneous
firm model falls from one to zero (Panel B); the domestic trade share in the homogeneous firm model
25
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
1
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
Panel A
Fixed exporting cost
W
el
fa
re
 g
ai
ns
 fr
om
 tr
ad
e
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Panel B
Fixed exporting cost
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 e
xp
or
tin
g
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
1
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
Panel C
Fixed exporting cost
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
Panel D
Fixed exporting cost
D
om
es
tic
 tr
ad
e 
sh
ar
e
Note: Variable trade costs=1.83
Figure 2: Reductions in fixed exporting costs
rises to one (Panel D); and welfare in the homogeneous firm model equals its autarkic value, even
though there remain substantial welfare gains from trade in the heterogeneous firm model (Panel A).
However, even for fixed exporting costs for which there is trade in both models, the differences
in welfare are again substantial. For example, for fx = 0.40, the difference in welfare gains from
trade between the two models (2 percentage points) is larger than the welfare gains from trade in
the homogeneous firm model (1 percentage point). These differences in welfare gains between the
two models are again explained by the endogenous responses of the domestic and export productivity
cutoffs to changes in trade costs in the heterogeneous firm model. As fixed exporting costs fall,
weighted average productivity in the domestic market in the heterogeneous firm model rises until the
point at which all firms export (Panels B, C and D). From this point onwards, further reductions in
fixed exporting costs reduce weighted average productivity in the domestic market until in the limiting
case of zero fixed exporting costs weighted average productivity is the same as in the closed economy.
Taken together, our analysis of the calibrated model suggests that for empirically plausible param-
eter values the differences in the aggregate predictions of the heterogeneous and homogeneous firm
models are of quantitative relevance.
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9 Conclusions
We compare a heterogeneous firm model to a homogeneous firm model that is a special case with a
degenerate productivity distribution. For a given level of trade costs, we show that welfare – as well
as other key aggregate variables – is the same in the two models. But welfare is strictly higher in
the heterogeneous firm model than in the homogeneous firm model for all other levels of trade costs.
The source of the higher welfare in the heterogeneous firm model is the presence of an additional
adjustment margin that is absent from the homogeneous firm model, namely the endogenous selection
of heterogeneous firms into domestic and export markets. We demonstrate these results for general
continuous productivity distributions and show that they hold both for movements between the closed
and the open economy and for changes in trade costs in the open economy equilibrium.
While we focus on the case of CES preferences and monopolistic competition considered by Krug-
man (1980) and Melitz (2003), the point that the heterogeneous firm model features an additional
adjustment margin relative to the homogeneous firm model is more general. In the case of variable
elasticity of substitution preferences or departures from monopolistic competition, the market equilib-
rium need not be efficient. Nonetheless, endogenous firm selection has the potential to generate higher
welfare in the heterogeneous firm model than in the homogeneous firm model, as long as adjustment
along this margin is similar in both the market equilibrium and social optimum.
In the special case where firm productivity is distributed Pareto with no upper bound, the het-
erogeneous firm model falls within the class considered by Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare
(2012). While in this special case the heterogeneous and homogeneous firm models can be calibrated
to achieve the same endogenous domestic trade share, reduced-form trade elasticity and welfare gains
from trade, this requires assuming a different elasticity of substitution between varieties and different
values of fixed and variable trade costs in the two models. Given the same structural parameters, the
two models have different aggregate welfare implications, with larger welfare gains from reductions in
trade costs in the heterogeneous firm model. These differences in aggregate welfare implications are
quantitatively substantial for empirically plausible parameter values.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We establish the proposition for the various possible types of open economy equilibria de-
pending on parameter values. (I) First, we consider parameter values for which the representative
firm does not find it profitable to export in the homogeneous firm model (τ (fx/Fd)
1/(σ−1) > 1). For
these parameter values, the proposition follows immediately from the fact that the two models have
the same closed economy welfare, there are welfare gains from trade, and trade only occurs in the
heterogeneous firm model. (II) Second, we consider parameter values for which the representative
firm exports in the homogeneous firm model and there is selection into export markets in the hetero-
geneous firm model (0 < τ (fx/Fd)
1/(σ−1) < 1 < τ (fx/fd)1/(σ−1)). From (19) and (25), open economy
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welfare is higher in the heterogeneous firm model than in the homogeneous firm model if the following
inequality is satisfied: (
ϕ˜Td
)σ−1
+ χτ1−σ
(
ϕ˜Tx
)σ−1
fe
1−G(ϕTd )
+ fd + χfx
>
(
1 + τ1−σ
) (
ϕ˜Ad
)σ−1
Fd + fx
. (40)
To show that this inequality must be satisfied, we use the open economy free entry condition in the
heterogeneous firm model, which implies:
fd
∫ ∞
ϕTd
[(
ϕ
ϕTd
)σ−1
− 1
]
dG (ϕ) + fx
∫ ∞
ϕTx
[(
ϕ
ϕTx
)σ−1
− 1
]
dG (ϕ) = fe,
fd
[
1−G (ϕTd )]
[(
ϕ˜Td
ϕTd
)σ−1
− 1
]
+ fx
[
1−G (ϕTx )]
[(
ϕ˜Tx
ϕTx
)σ−1
− 1
]
= fe,
fd
(
ϕ˜Td
ϕTd
)σ−1
+ fx
1−G (ϕTx )
1−G (ϕTd )
(
ϕ˜Tx
ϕTx
)σ−1
=
fe
1−G (ϕTd ) + fd + χfx.
Using
(
ϕTx
)σ−1
=
(
ϕTd
)σ−1
τσ−1fx/fd, we obtain:
fd(
ϕTd
)σ−1 [(ϕ˜Td )σ−1 + χτ1−σ (ϕ˜Tx )σ−1] = fe1−G (ϕTd ) + fd + χfx. (41)
Note that the open economy free entry condition in the heterogeneous firm model also implies:
fd
∫ ∞
ϕAd
[(
ϕ
ϕTd
)σ−1
− 1
]
dG (ϕ) + fx
∫ ∞
ϕAd
[(
ϕ
ϕTx
)σ−1
− 1
]
dG (ϕ) < fe, (42)
since ϕAd < ϕ
T
d < ϕ
T
x and [(
ϕ
ϕTd
)σ−1
− 1
]
< 0, for ϕ < ϕTd ,[(
ϕ
ϕTx
)σ−1
− 1
]
< 0 for ϕ < ϕTx .
Rewriting (42), we have:
fd
[
1−G (ϕAd )]
[(
ϕ˜Ad
ϕTd
)σ−1
− 1
]
+ fx
[
1−G (ϕAd )]
[(
ϕ˜Ad
ϕTx
)σ−1
− 1
]
< fe,
fd
(
ϕ˜Ad
ϕTd
)σ−1
+ fx
(
ϕ˜Ad
ϕTx
)σ−1
<
fe
1−G (ϕAd ) + fd + fx.
Using
(
ϕTx
)σ−1
=
(
ϕTd
)σ−1
τσ−1fx/fd, we obtain:
fd(
ϕTd
)σ−1 (1 + τ1−σ) (ϕ˜Ad )σ−1 < fe1−G (ϕAd ) + fd + fx. (43)
From (41) and (43), we have:
fd
(ϕTd )
σ−1
[(
ϕ˜Td
)σ−1
+ χτ1−σ
(
ϕ˜Tx
)σ−1]
fe
1−G(ϕTd )
+ fd + χfx
= 1, (44)
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fd
(ϕTd )
σ−1
(
1 + τ1−σ
) (
ϕ˜Ad
)σ−1
fe
1−G(ϕAd )
+ fd + fx
=
fd
(ϕTd )
σ−1
(
1 + τ1−σ
) (
ϕ˜Ad
)σ−1
Fd + fx
< 1,
which establishes that inequality (40) is satisfied. From (20) and (25), the condition for open economy
welfare to be higher in the heterogeneous firm model than in the homogeneous firm model can be also
written as: (
1
fd
) 1
σ−1
ϕTd >
(
1 + τ1−σ
Fd + fx
) 1
σ−1
ϕ˜Ad .
Using (40) and (44), this (equivalent) inequality is necessarily satisfied. Since closed economy welfare is
the same in the two models, and open economy welfare is higher in the heterogeneous firm model than
in the homogeneous firm model, it follows that the proportional welfare gains from trade are larger
in the heterogeneous firm model (WTHet/WAHet > WTHom/WAHom). (III) Third, we consider parameter
values for which the representative firm exports in the homogeneous firm model and all firms export
in the heterogeneous firm model, but fixed exporting costs are still positive (0 < τ (fx/Fd)
1/(σ−1) <
τ (fx/fd)
1/(σ−1) ≤ 1). This is simply a special case of (II) in which ϕTx = ϕTd , ϕ˜Tx = ϕ˜Td and
1−G(ϕTx )
1−G(ϕTd )
= 1. Therefore the same line of reasoning as in (II) can be used to show that the inequality
(40) is satisfied and hence open economy welfare is higher in the heterogeneous firm model than in
the homogeneous firm model. In this special case in which all firms export, the free entry condition
in the open economy equilibrium of the heterogeneous firm model implies:
(fd + fx)
∫ ∞
ϕTd
[(
ϕ
ϕTd
)σ−1
− 1
]
dG (ϕ) = fe,
(fd + fx)
∫ ∞
ϕAd
[(
ϕ
ϕTd
)σ−1
− 1
]
dG (ϕ) < fe, (45)
since ϕAd < ϕ
T
d and [(
ϕ
ϕTd
)σ−1
− 1
]
< 0, for ϕ < ϕTd .
Rewriting (45), we obtain:
(fd + fx)
(
ϕ˜Ad
ϕTd
)σ−1
<
fe
1−G (ϕAd ) + fd + fx = Fd + fx. (46)
From (21) and (25), the condition for open economy welfare to be higher in the heterogeneous firm
model than in the homogeneous firm model can be also written as:(
1
fd + fx
) 1
σ−1
ϕTd >
(
1
Fd + fx
) 1
σ−1
ϕ˜Ad .
From (46), this inequality is necessarily satisfied. Since closed economy welfare is the same in the two
models, and open economy welfare is higher in the heterogeneous firm model than in the homogeneous
firm model, it follows that the proportional welfare gains from trade are larger in the heterogeneous
firm model (WTHet/WAHet >WTHom/WAHom). (IV) Finally, when fixed exporting costs are zero, we have
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0 = τ (fx/Fd)
1/(σ−1) = τ (fx/fd)1/(σ−1). This is a special case of (III) in which ϕTx = ϕTd = ϕ
A
d ,
ϕ˜Tx = ϕ˜
T
d = ϕ˜
A
d and
1−G(ϕTx )
1−G(ϕTd )
= 1. In this special case of zero fixed exporting costs, the free entry
condition in the open economy equilibrium of the heterogeneous firm model implies:
(fd + fx)
∫ ∞
ϕAd
[(
ϕ
ϕTd
)σ−1
− 1
]
dG (ϕ) = fe,
(fd + fx)
(
ϕ˜Ad
ϕTd
)σ−1
=
fe
1−G (ϕAd ) + fd + fx = Fd + fx,
where we have used ϕAd = ϕ
T
d . From (21) and (25), it follows immediately that open economy welfare
is the same in the two models when fixed exporting costs are equal to zero.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. In the initial open economy equilibrium before the change in trade costs, (19) implies that
welfare in both the heterogeneous firm model and in the extended homogeneous firm model can be
written as: (
WT1Het
)σ−1
=
L
(
σ−1
σ
)σ−1 [(
ϕ˜T1d
)σ−1
+ χ1τ
1−σ
1
(
ϕ˜T1x
)σ−1]
σ
[
fe
1−G
(
ϕ
T1
d
) + fd + χ1fx1
] .
In the new open economy equilibrium after the change in trade costs, (19) implies that welfare in the
heterogeneous firm model is:
(
WT2Het
)σ−1
=
L
(
σ−1
σ
)σ−1 [(
ϕ˜T2d
)σ−1
+ χ2τ
1−σ
2
(
ϕ˜T2x
)σ−1]
σ
[
fe
1−G
(
ϕ
T2
d
) + fd + χ2fx2
] .
In contrast, in the new open economy equilibrium after the change in trade costs, welfare in the
extended homogeneous firm model is:
(
WT2Hom
)σ−1
=
L
(
σ−1
σ
)σ−1 [(
ϕ˜T1d
)σ−1
+ χ1τ
1−σ
2
(
ϕ˜T1x
)σ−1]
σ
[
fe
1−G
(
ϕ
T1
d
) + fd + χ1fx2
]
To show that welfare in the new open economy equilibrium is higher in the heterogeneous firm model
than in the homogeneous firm model, we need to show that:(
ϕ˜T2d
)σ−1
+ χ2τ
1−σ
2
(
ϕ˜T2x
)σ−1
fe
1−G
(
ϕ
T2
d
) + fd + χ2fx2 >
(
ϕ˜T1d
)σ−1
+ χ1τ
1−σ
2
(
ϕ˜T1x
)σ−1
fe
1−G
(
ϕ
T1
d
) + fd + χ1fx2 . (47)
To establish this inequality, we use the free entry condition in the new open economy equilibrium of
the heterogeneous firm model, which implies:
fd
∫ ∞
ϕ
T2
d
( ϕ
ϕT2d
)σ−1
− 1
 dG (ϕ) + fx2 ∫ ∞
ϕ
T2
x
[(
ϕ
ϕT2x
)σ−1
− 1
]
dG (ϕ) = fe,
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fd
[
1−G
(
ϕT2d
)]( ϕ˜T2d
ϕT2d
)σ−1
− 1
+ fx2 [1−G (ϕT2x )]
[(
ϕ˜T2x
ϕT2x
)σ−1
− 1
]
= fe,
fd
(
ϕ˜T2d
ϕT2d
)σ−1
+ fx2
1−G (ϕT2x )
1−G
(
ϕT2d
) ( ϕ˜T2x
ϕT2x
)σ−1
=
fe
1−G
(
ϕT2d
) + fd + 1−G (ϕT2x )
1−G
(
ϕT2d
)fx2.
Using
(
ϕT2x
)σ−1
=
(
ϕT2d
)σ−1
τσ−12 fx2/fd, we obtain:
fd(
ϕT2d
)σ−1 [(ϕ˜T2d )σ−1 + χ2τ1−σ2 (ϕ˜T2x )σ−1] = fe
1−G
(
ϕT2d
) + fd + χ2fx2. (48)
Note that the free entry condition in the new open economy equilibrium of the heterogeneous firm
model also implies:
fd
∫ ∞
ϕ
T1
d
( ϕ
ϕT2d
)σ−1
− 1
 dG (ϕ) + fx2 ∫ ∞
ϕ
T1
x
[(
ϕ
ϕT2x
)σ−1
− 1
]
dG (ϕ) < fe, (49)
since ϕT1d < ϕ
T2
d and ϕ
T1
x > ϕ
T2
x and( ϕ
ϕT2d
)σ−1
− 1
 < 0, for ϕ < ϕT2d ,
[(
ϕ
ϕT2x
)σ−1
− 1
]
> 0 for ϕT2x < ϕ < ϕ
T1
x .
Rewriting (49), we have:
fd
[
1−G
(
ϕT1d
)]( ϕ˜T1d
ϕT2d
)σ−1
− 1
+ fx2 [1−G (ϕT1x )]
[(
ϕ˜T1x
ϕT2x
)σ−1
− 1
]
< fe,
fd
(
ϕ˜T1d
ϕT2d
)σ−1
+ fx2
1−G (ϕT1x )
1−G
(
ϕT1d
) ( ϕ˜T1x
ϕT2x
)σ−1
<
fe
1−G
(
ϕT1d
) + fd + 1−G (ϕT1x )
1−G
(
ϕT1d
)fx2.
Using
(
ϕT2x
)σ−1
=
(
ϕT2d
)σ−1
τσ−12 fx2/fd, we obtain:
fd(
ϕT2d
)σ−1 [(ϕ˜T1d )σ−1 + χ1τ1−σ2 (ϕ˜T1x )σ−1] < fe
1−G
(
ϕT1d
) + fd + χ1fx2. (50)
From (48) and (50), we have:
fd(
ϕ
T2
d
)σ−1
[(
ϕ˜T2d
)σ−1
+ χ2τ
1−σ
2
(
ϕ˜T2x
)σ−1]
fe
1−G
(
ϕ
T2
d
) + fd + χ2fx2 = 1,
fd(
ϕ
T2
d
)σ−1
[(
ϕ˜T1d
)σ−1
+ χ1τ
1−σ
2
(
ϕ˜T1x
)σ−1]
fe
1−G
(
ϕ
T1
d
) + fd + χ1fx2 < 1,
which establishes the inequality (47).
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. (a) First, consider parameter values for which the representative firm exports in the ho-
mogeneous firm model and there is selection into export markets in the heterogeneous firm model
(0 < τ (fx/Fd)
1/(σ−1) < 1 < τ (fx/fd)1/(σ−1)). From (6) and (20), we have:
WTHet
WAHet
=
ϕTd
ϕAd
. (51)
In the special case of a Pareto productivity distribution and for these parameter values for which there
is selection into export markets in the heterogeneous firm model, we have:
ϕTd
ϕAd
=
1 +( 1
τ (fx/fd)
1/(σ−1)
)k
fx
fd
1/k ,
which can be written as:
ln
(
ϕTd
ϕAd
)
= k−1 ln
1 +( 1
τ (fx/fd)
1/(σ−1)
)k
fx
fd
 .
Note that
d ln(ϕTd /ϕ
A
d )
dk = −k−2 ln
[
1 +
(
1
τ(fx/fd)
1/(σ−1)
)k
fx
fd
]
−
k−1 ln(τ(fx/fd)1/(σ−1))
(
1
τ(fx/fd)
1/(σ−1)
)k
fx
fd[
1+
(
1
τ(fx/fd)
1/(σ−1)
)k
fx
fd
] < 0,
(52)
where we have used d (ax) /dx = (ln a) ax. Since a smaller value of k corresponds to greater pro-
ductivity dispersion, it follows that greater productivity dispersion implies larger ϕTd /ϕ
A
d . Second,
consider parameter values for which the representative firm exports in the homogeneous firm model
and all firms export in the heterogeneous firm model, but fixed exporting costs are still positive
(0 < τ (fx/Fd)
1/(σ−1) < τ (fx/fd)1/(σ−1) ≤ 1). From (6) and (21), we have:
WTHet
WAHet
=
((
1 + τ1−σ
)
fd
fd + fx
) 1
σ−1 ϕTd
ϕAd
.
In the special case of a Pareto productivity distribution and for these parameter values for which all
firms export in the heterogeneous firm model, we have:
ϕTd
ϕAd
=
[
1 +
fx
fd
]1/k
,
which can be written as:
ln
(
ϕTd
ϕAd
)
= k−1 ln
[
1 +
fx
fd
]
.
Note that
d ln
(
ϕTd /ϕ
A
d
)
dk
= −k−2 ln
[
1 +
fx
fd
]
< 0. (53)
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Since a smaller value of k corresponds to greater productivity dispersion, it follows that greater
productivity dispersion again implies larger ϕTd /ϕ
A
d . Taking (52) and (53) together and using (51),
it follows that greater dispersion of firm productivity (smaller k) implies larger proportional welfare
gains from opening the closed economy to trade. (b) Consider parameter values for which there
is selection into export markets in the open economy equilibrium of the heterogeneous firm model
(τ (fx/fd)
1/(σ−1) > 1). In the special case of a Pareto productivity distribution, we have:
ϕTd =
(
σ − 1
k − (σ − 1)
)1/k fd +
(
1
τ(fx/fd)
1/(σ−1)
)k
fx
fe

1/k
ϕmin.
We have:
dϕTd
dτ
τ
ϕTd
dτ = −
(
1
τ(fx/fd)
1/(σ−1)
)k
fx
fd +
(
1
τ(fx/fd)
1/(σ−1)
)k
fx
dτ
= −ξdτ.
Hence:
d
(
dϕTd
dτ
τ
ϕTd
dτ
)
dk
=
ln
(
τ (fx/fd)
1/(σ−1)
)(
1
τ(fx/fd)
1/(σ−1)
)k
fx
fd +
(
1
τ(fx/fd)
1/(σ−1)
)k
fx
(1− ξ) dτ,
which implies:
d
(
dϕTd
dτ
τ
ϕTd
dτ
)
dk
< 0 for dτ < 0,
d
(
dϕTd
dτ
τ
ϕTd
dτ
)
dk
> 0 for dτ > 0.
Therefore greater dispersion of firm productivity (smaller k) implies a larger elasticity of the domestic
productivity cutoff with respect to reductions in variable trade costs, which from (20) implies greater
proportional welfare gains from reductions in variable trade costs. By the same reasoning, greater
dispersion of firm productivity (smaller k) implies a smaller elasticity of the domestic productivity
cutoff with respect to increases in variable trade costs, which from (20) implies smaller proportional
welfare costs from increases in variable trade costs.
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